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Abstract. 
Over the past few years, the futures market has been successfully 
developing in the North-West region. Futures markets are one of the 
most effective and liquid-visible trading mechanisms. A large number 
of buyers are forced to compete with each other and raise their pric-
es. A large number of sellers make them reduce prices. Thus, the 
gap between the prices of offers of buyers and sellers is reduced due 
to high competition, and this is a good criterion for the liquidity of the 
market. This high degree of liquidity contributed to the fact that fu-
tures trading took such an important role in commerce and finance. 
A multi-step, non-cooperative n persons game is formalized and 
studied  
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1  Overview 
Futures are traded on specialized futures exchanges, where fair pric-
ing is provided due to the high concentration of supply and demand. 
The future prices for grain, metal, gasoline, the currency that the fu-
tures exchange generates is a sure guide for any enterprise planning 
its activity in the market conditions. The system of financial guaran-
tees operating on the futures exchange ensures unconditional fulfill-
ment of obligations, reliably protects the future price of the goods.  
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That is why all over the world banks, investment funds, wholesalers, 
industrial and agricultural enterprises come to the futures exchange, 
which gives them the opportunity not only to reduce commercial risk, 
but also to make a profit when trading in futures. 
 
Futures exchanges perform specific functions for the economy: trans-
fer risk, identify prices, increase liquidity and efficiency, increase the 
flow of information. Futures allow us to agree today on the price at 
which the purchase or sale will be made in the future. The basis is 
the ability to set today the price at which the future will be a purchase 
or sale. 
 
A futures contract - is an agreement between two parties to deliver 
goods of a certain quantity and quality in a certain place and at a cer-
tain time in the future, at the price agreed upon today, concluded ac-
cording to the rules of the exchange. The price at which a futures 
contract is concluded is determined by free competition among trad-
ing participants in the exchange's operating floor. 
Each futures contract has two sides: the buyer and the seller. The 
buyer of a futures contract is called a long-stakes party, and the sell-
er is a party with a short position. The buyer undertakes to make a 
purchase at a predetermined time. The seller undertakes to sell at a 
predetermined time. These obligations are determined by the name 
of the asset, the size of the asset, the term of the futures and the 
price agreed today. Only a whole number of futures can participate in 
trading. 
 
During the term of the contract, its price depends on the state of the 
conjuncture for the relevant product. Buyers benefit from higher pric-
es, as they will be able to receive the goods at a price lower than the 
current one. Sellers benefit from falling prices, as they contracted at 
a price higher than the current one. Simultaneously with the price 
fluctuation, the value of the contract also changes. For the holder of a 
long position, profits arise when prices rise, which increases the val-
ue of his contract. The fall in prices and, accordingly, the decrease in 
the value of the contract gives a profit to the holder of a short posi-
tion. The difference in the value of a contract for a long or short posi-
tion is defined as the difference between the transaction price and 
the current quote multiplied by the contract unit. 
 
Each holder of the short and long positions of the contract is obligat-
ed to provide his broker with a certain amount of money as a guaran-
tee of the performance of the contract. This deposit is called a mar-
gin. Its purpose is to protect the seller from non-fulfillment of the con-
tract by the buyer, if the prices have fallen, and the buyer, if prices 
have increased. The broker uses margin to cover the losses of the 
client, if his contract suffers losses. 
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In futures trading, there are two types of margin: 
The initial margin - is the deposit that is made when opening the fu-
tures position; 
Variation Margin - the transfer of funds, ensuring that the cost of se-
curing the new value of the contract follows the change in prices. 
 
The initial margin, set in value terms, is usually 2-10% of the value of 
the contract. In periods of high price volatility and high risk, the ex-
change can set a margin at the upper limit of 10% and even higher. 
The margin is not the value of a futures trading operation. The money 
that the client transfers to a special account is his property until, as a 
result of some unsuccessful operation, he does not lose it. At the 
time of the expiration of the futures contract, the margin currently 
available in the account with the broker is paid to the customer back. 
 
After the opening of the position and the introduction of the initial 
margin change of the futures contract price will lead to a correspond-
ing reduction or increase in the value of the client's position. After de-
termining the settlement price of the day, for each of the contracts 
and each position, the change in the value of each exchange con-
tract is calculated based on the difference between the settlement 
price of the given day and the previous day or the price at which the 
transaction was concluded. If the situation on the futures market 
changes for some day in a favorable for the client side, the amount of 
money in the margin account increases by the size of the potential 
win. If these price changes are unfavorable for the client's position, 
then its initial margin decreases. As soon as the amount of the cus-
tomer's initial margin has been reduced to the level of variation mar-
gin, additional funds may be required from the client. This require-
ment is caused by unfavorable changes in futures contract prices. 
Thus, the margin shows the profits and losses of the customer for the 
day. Those funds that exceed the required amount can be withdrawn 
by the client, but more often they remain on the account with the bro-
ker as a reserve. 
 
Real goods can be sold and bought in two separate, but related mar-
kets - cash and futures. The prices of the cash and futures markets 
are very closely related. Futures markets have a solid foundation in 
reality. 
 
The cash market - is the place where the goods change the owner 
for a certain price. Realization of transactions in the cash market is 
the purchase and sale of cash at current prices, the delivery of which 
is carried out immediately or within a few days after the conclusion of 
the transaction. 
 
Cash prices - is the prices for which the goods are sold in different 
parts of the market. At each moment there are many cash prices de-
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pending on the quality of the goods, the place of delivery, the pro-
cessing stage of the goods and other factors. 
 
In the conditions of the futures market, it is a question of the future 
delivery of the goods in certain terms. In contrast to the cash market, 
the futures market has only one set of prices. The futures price is the 
current view of the market on how much the commodity of a certain 
quality will cost with certain delivery conditions at some point in the 
future. Time and expectations of market participants - these are the 
two factors that determine the difference in prices in the cash and fu-
tures markets. 
 
Both markets exist in parallel, but at the expiration of each period, 
they seem to merge, destroying the existing price differences. At the 
time of delivery in the futures and cash markets, asset prices will be 
the same because of quotations for the immediate delivery of the as-
set in both markets. This coincidence at one point is called conver-
gence. The parallel movement of these markets is due to the fact that 
factors leading to higher prices affect futures prices in the same di-
rection. 
 
For the difference between cash and futures prices, there is the con-
cept of basis. The basis is the difference between the price of the 
goods in the cash market in a particular place and at the same price 
as the commodity in the futures market. The basis is calculated by 
subtracting the price in the futures market from the cash price, which 
usually means the closest futures month (period): 
 
Cash price - Futures price = Basis 
The basis is positive, negative and zero. If the basis is positive, then 
the price of the cash market exceeds the futures price or comes with 
a premium to the futures price. If the basis is negative, the cash price 
is lower than the futures price or comes at a discount to the futures 
price. If the basis is zero, the cash price is equal to the futures price. 
There can be many bases for one product at one time, because if 
there is only one price of a futures contract for a certain product, then 
there are a lot of cash prices for this product, depending on the quali-
ty and the place of delivery. 
 
The basis is not a constant value. Since the prices of the cash and 
futures markets are constantly changing, the basis becomes wider or 
narrower. The factors that influence the size of the basis are quite a 
lot: they are the demand and supply for a certain period, the volume 
of the stock of production, the forecast for the production of goods in 
the current year, the supply and demand for similar products, the ex-
port and import of goods, the availability of warehouses for storage, 
moves and a number of others. 
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There are two types of dynamics of the basis:  
Strengthening the basis (narrowing) is a change in the basis at which 
the cash price rises within a certain period of time relative to the fu-
tures price. 
 
Weakening of the basis (expansion) - occurs when the cash price is 
lowered relative to the futures price for a certain period of time and 
becomes less stable than the futures price. The type of dynamics of 
the basis, most favorable for a particular market participant, depends 
on whether he is a seller 
or the buyer. The seller wins with a strong base, and the buyer wins 
with a weak base. 
 
Futures can be used in various situations: to avoid risk or to generate 
high returns with high risk. Futures trading can be both very risky and 
very profitable. Futures trading involves hedgers, speculators and 
arbitrageurs. The main goal of a hedger is to reduce the percentage 
of risk. The speculator is looking for high returns due to high risk. The 
purpose of the arbitrage is income without risk due to market incon-
sistencies. 
 
On futures exchanges, all transactions are primarily speculative in 
nature or are made for the purpose of insurance against price risks. 
 
Speculative transactions are made on the stock exchange in order to 
obtain profit from the purchase and sale of exchange contracts as a 
result of the difference between the price of the exchange contract on 
the day of imprisonment and the price on the day of its execution, 
with a favorable price change for one of the parties (the seller and 
the buyer). Moreover, exchange speculation is a mechanism for iden-
tifying and stabilizing prices for goods. 
 
Futures contracts are also used in hedging. This is an operation to 
insure price risk by trading futures contracts. The principle of insur-
ance here is based on the fact that if in a transaction one side loses 
as a seller of a real commodity, then it wins as a futures buyer for the 
same quantity of goods, and vice versa. The mechanism of hedging 
is based on the fact that the change in market prices for futures are 
the same in their size and direction. 
There are also arbitrage transactions that are made for the purpose 
of making a profit due to the difference in quotations on stock ex-
changes in different countries. 
 
Having sold (bought) the futures contract, the participant opens a po-
sition in the futures market. Close this position, he can either by exe-
cuting a contract, or by buying (selling) the same contract. The sale 
and purchase of a contract of the same type compensate each other 
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and are not taken into account in the calculations between the partic-
ipants. If the futures contract sold on the exchange is not compen-
sated by the purchase of the same contract, then with the onset of 
the month of execution, it must deliver a standard product. The quan-
tity and quality of the goods supplied, the amount of payment, time, 
place and other conditions of delivery are strictly regulated by the 
rules. 
 
Every day, customers' accounts reflect changes that have occurred 
in the value of contracts that they have opened. If the customer has a 
long position, and the prices have increased, his funds will increase, 
as the result for open positions increases. The gain will be the differ-
ence in the value of his open contract. Excess funds can be trans-
ferred by the client or used by him for opening new positions. 
 
In the futures market, the transaction participant controls its invest-
ment of capital with less money than in other markets. 
 
On the last day of the term of the futures contract, the amount of 
costs is zero. 
   
2 Problem statement. Mathematical description of 
the model 
 
In this paper, a competitive model of decision-making in the futures 
contract market is considered. Agents who own the initial capital, 
come to the futures contracts market and conclude contracts, in or-
der to obtain maximum profit. The actions of agents are carried out at 
specific times. It is required to choose agents control so that the ef-
fect of investing in futures contracts is maximized. 
 
As a method of solution we will use the method of compromise solu-
tion.   
 Let there be n agents on the market, i = n,1 . They carry out 
their activities through brokerage offices, paying them a commission 
fee for their services (we will assume that the commissions are pre-
cisely defined for each contract). Let there be s  contracts in circula-
tion, j = s,1 , acting on the time interval [0,T]. 
 
  Consider the partition of the interval 0 = 
1t  < 2t  < … < ft = T. 
At time t  = kt ,  k = 1,1 −f  the market state is described by the vector 
of futures prices  
tx = ( tx1 ,…, 
t
jx ,…,
t
sx ), 
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where tjx  – is the futures price j – th contract at the time t = kt ,  
 k = 1,1 −f . 
 We will assume that at every moment t  = kt  agents have 
complete information about the history of the process. At the time kt  
the agent i  enters into a set of futures contracts. 
t
iu = (
t
iu1 , 
t
iu2 ,…, 
t
ist
u ), i = n,1  , t [0,T]. 
 Control t
iu  is called agent Control i  at time t  = kt , k = 1,1 −f . 
 The set of agent controls tU = ( tu1 ,…,
t
nu ) is called the control 
of the market at time t  = kt , k = 1,1 −f .  
 The prices of futures contracts change at each time  t  = kt ,  k 
= 1,1 −f , depending on the actions of agents, on the situation prevail-
ing in the market and from other possible control moments. 
The system goes from one state to another, depending on the previ-
ous quotes and from the controls chosen by the agents according to 
the rule: 
1+t
jx =  (
t
jx , 
tU ), 
 where   — is the transition operator, which is constructed on the 
basis of statistics collected over a sufficiently long period of time. 
 
  For simplicity, we assume that the term of the futures con-
tract, which was concluded at the time t , expires at the next moment 
of time t +1. 
 
At the end of each period of time, all futures contracts are settled, 
new futures contracts prices are determined and the revenue (loss-
es) that each agent receives from their positions are calculated. The 
difference in the value of a contract for a long or short position is de-
fined as the difference between the transaction price and the current 
quotation multiplied by the contract unit. 
That is, the change in the value of the contract is equal to the change 
in the price multiplied by the value of the contract. If it has a positive 
value, then it gives a profit to the side owning a long position in the 
contract, and if negative, then the profit to the party owning the short 
position in the contract. If the agent has several contracts, the total 
result is determined by multiplying by the number of contracts. 
 
 Let's describe in detail the decision-making process by the 
agent i  at the time t = kt , k = 1,1 −f :  
We use the following notation: 
t
jx  – this is the futures price of the j-th contract at the time t = kt ,   
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k = 1,1 −f ; 
t
iK – free i - th agent capital by the time t ; 
t
jy – the cash price of the commodity traded in the j-th contract at the 
time  t = kt ,  k = 1,1 −f ; 
jq – the quantity of the goods established in the j-th contract; 
jm – The margin established for the j-th contract; 
jp – commission fee, established for the j-th contract; 
rs – the number of futures contracts concluded at the r-th step,  
       
rs s , 1,1 −= Tr ; 
t
iW  – income of the i-th agent at time  t = kt , k = 1,1 −f .        
 1. At time t  = 
1t  the agent i  owns the starting capital 
1
iK . He 
decides on the conclusion of futures contracts by number 
1s , while 
making costs in the form of commission jp  and margin jm , j = 1,1 s . 
It is assumed that the restriction is fulfilled: 0 < 
=
+
1
1
)(
s
j
jj pm   
1
jK . 
 By the end of the first period, his income is 
1
iW
 = 1jK  -
=
+
1
1
)(
s
j
jj pm . 
 2. At time t  = 
2t  the amount of free capital changes and be-
comes equal to 2iK  = 
1
iW . Futures that have been concluded earlier, 
already expire and bring in revenue 
=
−+
1
1
12 ))((
s
j
jjjjj qxxm  , after 
which the agent decides to enter new futures contracts in the amount 
2s , while making the costs of their conclusion 
=
+
2
1
)(
s
j
jj pm . By the 
end of the second period, his income is 
2
iW
 = 2iK  + 
= =
+−−+
1 2
1 1
12 )())((
s
j
s
j
jjjjjjj pmqxxm  , 
where jq - is the value of the contract, j ={1, -1} – characterizes the 
purchase or sale.  
In this case, the following restriction is assumed: 2iW 0. 
 
 p. At time t  = pt  the amount of free capital will change and will 
be equal to piK  = 
1−p
iW . Contracts that were concluded at time p –1, 
will expire and yield revenue 
−
=
−−+
1
1
1 ))((
ps
j
j
p
j
p
jjj qxxm  , then the 
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agent i  decides to enter new futures contracts with a number ps , 
while generating costs in the form of commissions and margins. His 
income by the end of period p will be equal to  
 
p
iW =
p
iK  + 
−
= =
− +−−+
1
1 1
1 )())((
p ps
j
s
j
jjj
p
j
p
jjj pmqxxm  . 
In this case, the following restriction is assumed: piW 0.  
And so on. 
 
T. At the last moment of time t  = T the amount of free capital will 
change and become equal to TiK  = 
1−T
iW . Contracts that were con-
cluded at the time            t  = T-1, expire and bring in revenue 
 
T. = T, =. = T-1  

−
=
−−+
1
1
1 ))((
Ts
j
j
T
j
T
jjj qxxm  . 
 At the time t  = T  new contracts are not concluded, so the agent's 
income by the end of the last period will amount to 
T
iW
 = TiK  +
−
=
−−+
1
1
1 ))((
Ts
j
j
T
j
T
jjj qxxm  .  
It is this magnitude that should maximize each agent. 
 
Note: At the beginning of each period, each agent owns a certain 
amount of free capital. Under free capital we will assume the cash 
available at the moment at the agent's disposal and the real goods 
that the agent owns for this period, expressed in money terms, in ac-
cordance with the prices of the cash market at a given time. 
 
3 Description of the problem in terms of dynam-
ic programming. Deterministic case. 
 
As a method of optimization, we will use the method of dynamic pro-
gramming. 
 
Let's consider the case when there is no uncertainty, that is, when all 
the data is determined exactly and the transition of the system from 
one state to another is carried out with probability equal to one. 
 
Agents make decisions at discrete instants of time t = kt , k = 1,1 −f . 
Therefore, we can break this process into 1−f  a stage. 
Let us take as the initial state of the system the free capital of the i-th 
agent at the time: 0=t : 0iK , i = n,1 . The free capital of agents at the 
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end of each period Ti
T
iii WKKK ,,...,,
21 , i = n,1 , will be treated as sys-
tem states at discrete moments of time t = kt , k = 1,1 −f .  
 
The efficiency of the process will be characterized by income 
p
iW =
p
iK  + 
−
= =
− +−−+
1
1 1
1 )())((
p ps
j
s
j
jjj
p
j
p
jjj pmqxxm  , 
received by each agent i , i = n,1  for p first periods of time. Efficien-
cy is expressed by a function 
011 )()( i
tt
i
tt
i KUWUS −=
−− , Tt ,2= , 
We will maximize this function. 
 
 We introduce the function ))(,( 21 −− rk t
t
ik USt , denoting the in-
come received by the agent for k first steps under the optimal policy. 
The functions ))(,( 21 −− rk ttik USt , k = 1,1 −f  satisfy the functional equa-
tions of the form 
 
}))(,({))(,( 3221 1max kkk
ktUk
t
u
rk t
i
tt
ik
tt
ik SUStUSt +=
−−

−−
− , 
Where 
1−−= kkk ti
t
i
t
i SSS  — 
an increase in the income of the agent over a period of time [ 1, −kk tt ], 
and the set k
t
U  – is the set of admissible controls at this step, which 
is determined by the following restrictions 0)( 1 −tti US . 
The equations given above are the basic functional equations of dy-
namic programming. 
Let at the initial instant of time the total income of the agent be 
 
00
ii SW = ,  
consequently, the functions ))(,( 21 −− rk t
t
ik USt , for k = 1,1 −f  assume 
the form 
k
ktUk
t
u
rk t
i
tt
ik WUSt max))(,( 21

−− = . 
 As a result of applying the dynamic programming method, 
knowing the values of the initial capital, we obtain a sequence of 
functions: { ))(,( 21 −− rk t
t
ik USt } – the function of the maximum income, 
 i = n,1 , k = 1,1 −f , and the corresponding optimal controls   
t
iu = (
t
iu1 , 
t
iu2 ,…, 
t
ist
u ), i = n,1  , t [0,T]. 
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4 Stochastic case. Description of the game 
 
A multi-step, non-cooperative game of n persons is being construct-
ed 
 = < I = {1,…,n}, n
iiU 1}{ = ,
n
iiW 1}{ = >, 
where I = {1,…,n}- is the set of agents, 
 iU  – a set of strategies of the agent i , 
 iW : U = 
i
iU → 1R  - is the i agent's payoff function, i  = n,1 . 
 To solve the problem, we will use the principle of a compro-
mise solution. 
 
Definition: Let be X — the set of profiles in a game Г, 
 iW : X = U = 
i
iU → 1R , i  = n,1  — the payoff function of agents,  
)(max xWM i
Xx
i

= . 
Then the compromise set is defined as follows: 
: 
}.)),(())((:{ maxmax XxxWMxWMXxC ii
i
ii
i
H −−=  
 
 The algorithm for finding a compromise set: 
1) Calculate the winning functions for all players from each game 
profile.  
2) Find the maximum value of the win of each player for all game 
profiles: 
)(max xWM i
Xx
i

= , i  = n,1 .  
3) For each profile xX calculate the deviation of the payoff function 
of the i-th agent )(xWi  , from the maximum iM , i  = n,1 .  
4) For each profile x from X, we find the maximum deviation of the 
difference 
)(xWM ii − , i  = n,1 , 
that is, we compute 
))((max xWM ii
i
− . 
5) On the set of profiles X we find a point x , that delivers a minimum 
to the expression ))((max xWM ii
i
− , that is, we find the profile x :  
).())((maxmin xWMxWM iiii
iXx
−=−

 
 The profile in which the minimum is reached, and will be a 
compromise point for all players. 
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Since all compromise profiles are equivalent in the sense of this prin-
ciple of optimality, that is, each of them gives the guaranteed win of 
the least satisfied player, then we will choose the strategy that corre-
sponds to the largest of the winning functions. 
 
 Thus, provided that all agents have chosen specific controls 
tU , the guaranteed income of the agent i  , at the last step is equal 
to the value 
).)))()((((
1
1
211
maxmin 
−
=
−−−

−++
Ts
j
j
TT
j
TT
jjj
iXx
T
i qUxUxmK   
 
 Using the method of dynamic programming, the guaranteed 
income at the final point in time with fixed member tU  control is cal-
culated. Agent tU  control at each step is selected in accordance with 
the principle of a compromise solution, then at each step a single 
control is selected by the method of backward procedures, resulting 
in a single process trajectory. 
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